The Unending Storm: War, Resources, and the Great Lakes dilemma.
In
recent history, for more than three decades, the African Great Lakes region has
been trapped in a cycle of wars, displacement, and resource exploitation. At
its heart lies eastern Congo—a geopolitical fault line where history, identity,
and economics collide.
In
the hills of eastern Congo, war is not an event but a condition of life.
Millions of Congolese have been uprooted, forced into endless flight by waves
of violence that have never truly ceased since the fall of Mobutu. Entire
generations have grown up in displacement camps around Goma, Masisi, and
Rutshuru. Women and children bear the brunt of sexual violence, hunger, and
disease. Families flee with nothing but their dignity, and even that is often
stripped away.
This
is not simply a Congolese crisis. It is a regional quagmire, rooted in legacies
of genocide, cross-border militia activity, and the pursuit of wealth in one of
the most resource-rich regions on earth.
The
Congo’s modern history reads like the eye of a storm — brief moments of calm
surrounded by endless turbulence. After Lumumba’s assassination and the
nationalist threat was crushed, the UN forced Katanga to reunite with Congo,
appearing to deliver Lumumba’s dream of unity. But what followed was not peace,
but a tempest of power struggles. In 1961, Congolese leaders proposed a
confederation of states, only for UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to
strike a secret deal with President Kasa-Vubu to kill the plan. Katanga’s Moïse
Tshombe, feeling betrayed, turned on the UN, igniting a war in Élisabethville.
Hammarskjöld’s plane was shot down during peace negotiations — a death that
still fueled suspicion.
Katanga fought on for two years, bankrolled by mining giant UMHK(Union Minière du Haut-Katanga), until U.S. fighter jets helped the UN crush Tshombe’s forces. Congo was reunified, but the storm never cleared. In 1965, Joseph Mobutu seized power and ruled for 32 years, converting Congo into a machine for his personal wealth. He nationalized Katanga’s mines, renamed the country Zaire, and siphoned billions while Western powers looked the other way so long as he stood against communism. (Siddharth Kara, Cobalt Red, ST.Martin's Press, New York, 2023, 105)
But even dictators are not immune to the winds of history. Copper prices crashed, the Cold War ended, and Mobutu’s grip weakened. Then came 1994 genocide against Tutsi, which sent millions of refugees into eastern Zaire. This influx of refugees — including génocidaires — transformed Zaire’s crisis from a domestic collapse into a regional tinderbox. What had been Mobutu’s slow political decay suddenly became a full-blown security emergency that drew in Rwanda, Uganda, and eventually the entire Great Lakes region. But like Mobutu before him, Laurent-Désiré Kabila turned into a storm unto himself — enriching his circle through secret mining deals and waging war with resources meant to rebuild the nation. (Siddharth Kara, 2023, 106)
Joseph
Kabila revived the mining sector under a new investment code and struck massive
deals with China, trading minerals for infrastructure but also for personal
kickbacks. Even after overstaying his constitutional term, he eventually
orchestrated the 2018 election of Félix Tshisekedi — Congo’s first peaceful
transfer of power since independence.
Tshisekedi has tried to shift the winds: seeming like fighting corruption, pressing Chinese companies to improve transparency, and aligning closer with the United States. But the storm has not passed. The same man is currently using the minerals income to enrich himself and his family, and that as it was not enough he uses the income from minerals to fund wazalendo his own created genocidal machine, hiding under the name of patriots but killing innocent civilians because of who they are. (Special Report, 'DR Congo: The Tshisekedi Family is Looting Katanga Dry', ktpress, March 3, 2025, September 28, 2025)
Since
taking office, President Félix Tshisekedi has faced accusations of mineral
looting and corruption involving his family and close associates. A complaint
was filed in Belgium in July 2025 by civil society groups and former mining
executives, targeting nine of his family members for illicit mining activities
in the mineral-rich Katanga region.
These
allegations are not just about money. They strike at the heart of Congo’s
fragile social contract, deepening mistrust in Kinshasa’s commitment to reform
and leaving ordinary Congolese feeling abandoned by their own government.
Since
Tshisekedi took office in 2019, Katanga’s wealth has become the cash cow of the
presidential clan. Copper and cobalt riches flow to Kinshasa and to foreign
partners, while the provinces themselves remain underdeveloped. Despite the
2018 mining code that was supposed to channel revenues into schools, roads, and
community projects, little has been done.
The
result: Katanga’s roads remain impassable, hospitals are scarce, and poverty
deepens, even as international copper and cobalt prices hit record highs.
Gécamines, the state mining company, is being stripped of its assets and pushed
to the brink, threatening the livelihoods of its 9,000 employees.
In a dramatic legal twist, several members of Congo’s first family now stand accused of plundering the country’s most valuable mines. The complaint, filed in Belgium, targets Belgian nationals closely linked to President Félix Tshisekedi — including his sister-in-law, sons, brothers, cousins, and even the First Lady herself. (The Brussels Times, 8 July 2025. September 28, 2025)
The
case, presented to federal prosecutor Ann Fransen by prominent lawyers Bernard
and Brieuc Maingain, accuses the group of being “accomplices to acts of
corruption and other criminal activities” tied to mining operations in Lualaba
and Haut-Katanga, Congo’s mineral-rich southern provinces.
The
lawyers act on behalf of a coalition of Katangan NGOs and four former directors
of Gécamines, the state-owned mining giant now reportedly being stripped of its
most valuable assets.
The
complaint marks a rare and direct legal challenge to Congo’s presidential
entourage — potentially exposing a vast system of alleged looting, kickbacks,
and illegal exploitation of the nation’s $320 billion copper and cobalt
reserves. For the people of Katanga, it is a first step toward justice for what
they describe as years of exploitation at the hands of those in power.
The
dilemma remains: Congo’s resources fuel global progress, yet its people remain
trapped in cycles of war, exploitation, and betrayal. From Diego Cão’s first
landing in 1482 to the cobalt rush of today, the heart of Africa has been a
prize to be captured rather than a nation to be uplifted. Patrice Lumumba’s
dream of a Congo that serves its own people flickered briefly — and was
crushed. The question is whether this storm will ever end, or whether the Great
Lakes region will remain forever hostage to its riches. (Diogo Cão – History of Africa – Before 1800)
But Congo’s crisis does not stop at its borders. Its instability bleeds outward, pulling neighbors into its wars and inviting intervention. Nowhere is this more visible than in the fraught relationship between Kinshasa and Kigali — a relationship haunted by the ghosts of 1994. The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was never confined within Rwanda’s borders. The perpetrators fled into Congo, regrouped, and rebranded as the FDLR. Their presence has poisoned regional politics ever since. For Rwanda, the FDLR represents an existential threat, a genocidal force biding its time to “finish the job.” For Kinshasa, however, these militias have often been a convenient proxy—tolerated, even supported, as a counterweight to other rebels like M23. Thus, Congo’s territory has become both sanctuary and battlefield, where local grievances are fused with regional rivalries. (Rugira, Lonzen. “Africa’s Curse of Narrow Interests Prevents Resolution of DRC Conflict.”)
The
Great Lakes war machine operates on denial and impunity: genocidaires rebranded
as “refugees,” armed groups rewarded with government posts, and peace deals
signed without enforcement. Each failure deepens mistrust and prolongs the
storm.
Eastern
Congo sits on a mountain of wealth: cobalt, coltan, gold, tin. These minerals
power the global digital and green economy—smartphones, electric cars, solar
panels. Yet for local communities, this wealth is a curse. Armed groups,
Congolese elites, foreign companies, and neighboring armies have all fought to
control the mines and smuggling routes.
War
is profitable. Peace is not. Every ceasefire that threatens to close off
illicit revenue streams is sabotaged. International companies, eager for cheap
supply chains, turn a blind eye to the blood that stains their minerals. The
cycle is brutally rational: keep Congo unstable, keep the resources flowing.
Billions have been spent on peace processes: Lusaka, Sun City, Nairobi, Luanda. The UN mission in Congo (ONUC/MONUC/MONUSCO) has been the largest peacekeeping operation in the world. Yet the results are meagre. The peace industry sustains itself—endless conferences, reports, and photo opportunities—but fails to deliver security. MONUSCO’s presence has not prevented massacres in Beni, Ituri, or Kivu. Instead, it has become a symbol of inertia, a heavily funded witness to suffering. This failure has created a dangerous vacuum, forcing regional states to fill the gap on their own terms — often through military action rather than diplomacy. Without a coherent international strategy, each country pursues its own survival, sometimes at the expense of collective peace. (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “Background,”)
The
deeper problem is that peace is treated as an event to be negotiated, rather
than a system to be enforced. Without accountability, agreements are signed
today and broken tomorrow.
The
UN Security Council speaks the language of principles—human rights,
sovereignty, protection of civilians. But when these principles collide with
the interests of powerful states, it is the principles that are sacrificed.
Congo is both tragedy and theatre: Western governments condemn instability while their corporations profit from minerals extracted in lawless conditions. Sanctions target African actors while global firms escape scrutiny. Human rights become a tool of pressure, selectively applied, never universal.
This
moral failure erodes trust. For Rwanda, constantly accused but rarely listened
to, it confirms that the international system is more interested in narratives
than realities.
President
Paul Kagame has warned repeatedly that Rwanda will not tolerate an existential
threat on its doorstep. His speeches at the AU and UN are no longer couched in
diplomatic niceties but in the language of survival: Rwanda doesn’t need
permission to protect herself. (
This
uncompromising tone is rooted in history. In 1994, Rwanda learned the price of
waiting for international rescue. For Kigali, neutrality in the face of the
FDLR is complicity.
The
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), championed at the UN in the early
2000s, was supposed to ensure that never again would the world stand idle in
the face of genocide. Yet in practice, it has been inconsistently applied, more
often invoked for strategic interventions than for genuine humanitarian
protection. (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.)
Rwanda,
scarred by the failure of 1994, interprets R2P as both duty and right: the duty
to protect its citizens, and the right to pre-empt existential threats. This is
the lens through which Kigali views Congo—not interference, but survival.
Europe
once waged endless wars under the doctrine of realism: states pursue their
interests, and when diplomacy fails, war is diplomacy by other means. But after
centuries of devastation, Europe turned to integration. By weaving economies,
institutions, and identities together, it moved towards idealism: sacrificing
narrow national interests for collective security and prosperity. The EU’s
richer states accept costs to support poorer members because they recognize a
deeper truth: instability next door will eventually destabilize them. Either
all are secure, or none are.
Africa
has mimicked Europe’s institutions but not its philosophy. The African Union
resembles the EU on paper, but lacks the spirit of collective sacrifice.
National interests still dominate. In the DRC crisis, East African leaders
urged Tshisekedi towards dialogue. When he refused, they retreated into their
own calculations instead of applying collective pressure. This vacuum of moral
courage was filled by the amoral: alliances with genocidal groups dressed up as
“national interest.” South Africa’s troop deployment alongside the FDLR
exemplifies this dangerous slide.
Even
Angola, tasked by the AU as mediator, allowed its Lobito Corridor project to
overshadow its responsibility to enforce peace. By privileging its own projects
over collective stability, it undermined both its credibility and the AU’s
authority.
The
lesson is stark: without collective sacrifice, regional bodies will remain
impotent. The curse of narrow interests is perpetual instability.
The
Great Lakes conflict is not inevitable. It is the outcome of choices—by Congo’s
leaders, by regional powers, by the international community, and by
corporations profiting from chaos.
To
break the cycle requires systemic disruption: Neutralize the FDLR and all armed
groups without excuses. Hold the DRC government accountable for the equal
protection of all its citizens. Stop scapegoating Rwanda while ignoring Congo’s
governance failures. Create enforceable traceability for conflict minerals so
that war is no longer profitable. Elevate collective interest above narrow
realism—an African idealism grounded in shared destiny. Only then will the
displaced families in Sake, Rutshuru, and Masisi see a future beyond endless
flight. Only then will the Great Lakes region move from perpetual storm to
lasting peace. Human dignity must be valued above gold, cobalt, and coltan. Only
when the region decides that peace is more profitable than war will the storm
finally break.

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